It is undoubtedly a recognized rule of interpretation that when laws are parimateria, that is, to the extent that they are linked to form a system or a legislative code, these laws must be considered together as one system and must be interpreted and applied to each other. It is permissible to read the provisions of the two Acts together if they complement each other. The principle of parimateria is based on the idea that these acts have a legislative approach, continuity and common terminology. No change in meaning should be attributed unless it is intentional. Lord Mansfield noted: “The statues at Parimateria must all be seen as a system for suppressing mischief. The two Acts are only parts of the same provision. With respect to definitions, it was stated that “if a term is used in one law without a definition, but is defined in another law that is equivalent to the first act, the definition may be considered applicable to the use of the term in the first law. This can happen even if the definition is contained in a later statute. The only question that this doctrine must apply is whether, by borrowing the word, Parliament also intended to adopt its previous treatment. This can be a very difficult question.

One test is whether the two Acts of the Apostles are in parimateria. “I`m able to do more per day, which means I`m delivering more value to my clients – and it`s helped my margins with the amount I can charge. LexisNexis helps me make money. In summary, laws are considered equivalent to refer to the same subject if they refer to the same person or to things or to the same category of persons or things, or if they have the same reason or object. The doctrine of pari materia provides that reference to different laws relating to the same subject matter or characterizing part of the same system constitutes permissible aid to the interpretation of the provisions of a law. If, however, there are laws that are different in pari materia, which have been promulgated on different occasions or are even obsolete and do not refer to each other, they must be considered and interpreted together as a single system and as explanatory of each other. It can be seen that a code of laws relating to a subject has been managed by a spirit and a policy and must be coherent and harmonious in its various parts and provisions. In this sense, it is an established legal norm that all actions in pari materia must be considered together as if they were a law, and they aim to be compared in the construction of laws, because they are considered framed on a system and have a purpose in seeing.

The rationale for this rule is based on the interpretive assumption that the words used in the Act are used in the same meaning. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is refutable by the context of the statutes. That doctrine thus provides that any regulation relating, inter alia, to the system of labour regulation or taxation may be relied on to interpret legislation of the same category. In some cases, the Court has used this doctrine to infer the meaning of certain terms not defined in the law in question. However, caution should be exercised when importing word meanings from other laws. If a word is not defined in the law itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries or similar laws to know in what sense that word is understood. However, when choosing a word from the different meanings, context must always be taken into account, as it is a basic rule that “the meanings of words and phrases used in a law must take their color from the context in which they appear”. Therefore, “when the context makes the meaning of a word clear enough, it becomes useless to search for and select a particular meaning among the different meanings of which a word is capable, according to lexicographers.” In J.K.

Steal Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors, the Supreme Court, taking into account the parimeraria provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, held that acts which are in parimateria are to be considered together as a code and as the interpretation and application of the other. Referring to its earlier judgment in C.A. Abraham v. I.T.O., Kottayam It was stated that “the Court of Justice, when interpreting a tax law, cannot remedy any deficiency; the Court of Justice must interpret the law in its present form and, in case of doubt, in a manner favourable to the taxable person. However, in J.K. Steel, supra, the majority did not accept the contention that a listing in the Excise Duty Act could be interpreted by reference to a similar entry in the Customs Act, which was equivalent to the Excise Duty Act. Justice Sirki, who delivered the majority judgment, observed: “I do not understand how the insertion of item 63(36) in the First Schedule to the Customs Act or the subsequent amendment of the Indian Customs Act, 1934 by the Indian Customs Tariff (Amendment) Act, 1963 clarifies the interpretation of Section 26AA(i).” Hegde J.A., representing the dissenting opinion, appears to have relied on two important factors present in this case, namely that both references were included in the statutes on the same day and that the circumstances showed that they were included for a common purpose. Another important aspect of such an interpretation is that the social aspect of the legislation is also taken into account before acts are considered parity. Laws such as the Upper Limits Act and the Rent Act, which have been implemented with the aim of implementing different socio-economic plans, must be read in a complementary manner. Any interpretation to the contrary may give rise to contradictions and it would be impossible to achieve the objectives set by the legislation. It is therefore necessary to adopt a constructive attitude in the interpretation of such provisions and to define the main objective of the act concerned for the decision before the Court.